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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
The development of market relations in Russia gave rise to the estab-
lishment of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs). In 1997 there were about
80 formal groups and many more informal ones. About 10% of industrial
output was produced by registered FIGs. Besides, there were a lot of
integrated trading-industrial and industrial entities where not only pro-
duction and trade but also financial ties existed.
Why did the liberalization of economic life bring about the emergence of
these groups? Why did the development of market relations form intra
rather than inter-company ties between production and financial firms?
Based on the fact that integrated structures like FIGs (structures with
production and financial ties) are not an unusual feature of transition in
Russia, which also exist in developing and developed countries, it seems
reasonable to suggest that their formation and development is part of
general regularities of the market economy rather than the peculiarities
of Russian development.
The theory of industrial organization provides several fundamental rea-
sons for the development of integrated structures in any kind of econ-
omy. First of all, vertical integration where either asset specificity that
raises the possibility of economy of scale or monopolistic position of one
of the firms could lead to an increase in the  efficiency of integrated
structure compare to independently operating firms. Horizontal integra-
tion allowing an increase in the market power also could be another
reason for integration.
Contract theory also suggests an explanation for the advantages of inte-
grated structures in certain circumstances due to superior contract en-
forcement within these structures.
Tax factors should also be taken into account since either the transfer
pricing within the group or budget consolidation could efficiently de-
crease the tax burden of the group firms.
All these reasons become even stronger in a transition economy. Differ-
ent kinds of market imperfections due to the absence of many important
market institutions force firms to choose intrafirm relations rather than
market ties. For example, an inefficient financial system and money mar-
ket problems lead to emergence of a quasi-money or barter market. As
was shown by Guriev and Pospelov (1998) in this case the integration of
banks and industrial firms could efficiently decrease transaction costs
associated with quasi-money.
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There is no uniform opinion among experts about the consequences of
FIGs formation for the economy. On one hand there are notions that in-
vestment and industrial policy within the group promote economic
growth, that the ties between production and financial capital in groups
make up a deficiency of some important economic institutions. On the
other hand, there are arguments against formation of groups based on
the possible decrease of competition and negative impact of groups on
economic and legislative reforms. It is likely that both effects exist. All
regulations concerning FIGs issued in Russia over the last 5 years try to
diminish the negative consequences of the groups formation, mainly by
limiting ownership structures that make the monopolization of industries
impossible. However, till now the relative importance of positive influence
of FIGs on economic growth is not estimated. This is what government
policy with respect to groups should be based on.
The goal of this research is the investigation of the influence of industrial
firm's membership in Financial-Industrial Group on its investment be-
havior.
Independently of a particular type of modeling the general theoretical
prediction with respect to fixed investment behavior of firms participating
in groups is following. Assuming that both internal and external financing
is available, a gap between the costs of external and internal funds
should be smaller for group firms. This result, which is interpreted as a
decline in a firm's investment — change in a firm's net worth sensitivity at
a given level of investment opportunities for enterprises belonging to Fi-
nancial-Industrial Groups, was tested in a number of studies based on
Japanese (e.g. Hoshi et al., 1994) and Korean (e.g. Shin et al., 1999)
data. Empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that firms in the
groups are less credit rationing than the rest firms in the economy was
found.
Could we expect that the same predictions would be valid for the Rus-
sian Financial-Industrial Groups?
The analysis of the 1996–1997 firms' accounting data shows that the
volume of external long-term credits was negligible in the economy. This
and the existence at that time of the high yield GKO market raises
doubts as to the validity of the assumption concerning the availability of
external financing for fixed business investment in Russian firms. Ac-
cording to official statistics on aggregate level data about the sources of
firms' financing of fixed business investment in 1996 – 1997 only 2.5%
was due to bank loans, about 30% was from government and non-
budget funds and more than 50% was contributed by internally gener-
ated funds.
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In this research we show that the validity of the assumption of the avail-
ability of both external and internal finance for firms' fixed investment is
extremely important for empirical testing of the role of banks in FIGs.
Even if banks in Russia play the same role with respect to the firms par-
ticipating in Financial-Industrial Groups as in the FIGs in other countries,
providing better contract enforcement in the group firms compared to
the rest of the economy, the empirical evidence in favor of such hy-
pothesis will be opposite depending on whether  the external financing is
available or not.
Assuming that the only source of finance for investment is the retained
earnings of the firms we show that the higher investment-retained earn-
ings sensitivity for firms participating in Financial-Industrial Groups rela-
tive to the rest firms in the economy will be the empirical evidence in fa-
vor of the hypothesis of better contract enforcement in groups' firms
compare to the rest of the economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main conclu-
sions of recent literature on fixed business investments. Section 3 pro-
vides main hypotheses and the theoretical framework. Data description
and estimation results are in Sections 4 and 5. The last section con-
cludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the last decade, a number of researches concerning fixed business
investment were undertaken in different countries. Almost all of them
have stressed the importance of proxies for firms' internal finance as
explanatory variable for investment activity, especially for firms likely to
face information-related capital-market imperfections. One of the
suggested explanations for such dependence was the existence of the
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders that cause the
gap between the external and internal financing. Theoretically, several
reasons could be responsible for this gap. First of all, adverse selection
could generate this gap under the assumption of imperfect information
about the risks associated with borrower's investment project. Second,
the possibility of opportunistic behavior of managers (moral hazard)
creates the costs of monitoring of managerial actions and it requires a
higher return for external suppliers of funds relative to internally
generated funds. In these circumstances, the validity of predictions of
neoclassical theory of fixed business investment and namely the results
of Modigliani–Miller theorem that the firm's decision about real
investment is independent of financial factors such as liquidity or
leverage becomes questionable.
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Hubbard (1998) in the survey indicates that effects of informational
asymmetries on investment both in the adverse selection and moral haz-
ard settings have broadly similar consequences for the cost of funds and
investment. He shows that for firms bearing different information costs
an increase in net worth independent of the changes in investment op-
portunity has different effects on investment. In particular, for the firms
bearing negligible information costs there should be no such effect,
while it should be strong enough for firms facing high information costs.
Given this, he suggests that 1) controlling for investment opportunities
and information costs, firms with higher changes in net worth will invest
more; and 2) controlling for investment opportunities, investment-change
in net worth sensitivity will be higher for firms bearing higher information
costs.
Different proxies can be used for the information-related costs borne by
the firms. If we want to emphasize the information imperfection aspect of
firms' performance we can use the following characteristics of firms as a
basis for grouping: the firm's age, size, its relationship with industrial
groups or financial intermediaries and dividend policy.
Numerous empirical studies using different specifications of the neoclas-
sical investment model and different firm-level panel data sets have re-
jected the simple models based on the null hypothesis of perfect capital
markets even for the most developed countries usually referred to as the
countries with Anglo–Saxon type of fund market.
The most popular specification of the neoclassical theory used in these
researches was the Q-theory approach suggested by James Tobin
(1969). Given special assumptions on production function, the cost of
adjusting the capital stock function, competitiveness of product and
factor markets and frictionless capital market and assuming that firms
maximize their expected values, the following investment specification
could be obtained:
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where i and t denote the firm and time period respectively, Kit is the
capital stock at the beginning of the period, Iit is investment, λit is exoge-
nous technological shock, εit is optimization error and qit – pt is the mar-
ginal present discounted value of profits from new fixed investment less
the price of investment goods. Under certain assumption, the average Q
constructed from financial market data as the ratio of stock market value
of a firm to the replacement cost of its capital may be used as a proxy
for marginal Q. And again, among these assumptions there is an as-
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 9
sumption of the independence of financing and investment decisions that
also implies the frictionlessness of capital market. When all of these as-
sumptions hold, it is possible to investigate the following equation on
firm-level panel data:
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However, if in the framework of this model we introduce some friction in
the capital market, for instance, information asymmetry, then we imme-
diately get the dependence of firms' investments on the changes in net
worth of the firms. Therefore, in this case one can expect that the re-
siduals from the regression (2) would be correlated with the proxy for
these changes. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect that this effect
would be stronger for firms that are more likely to face binding financial
constraints.
There were these two implications that were investigated in different re-
searches. Using cash flow CF as a proxy for the change in net worth
Fazzari et al. (1988) tested the following equation
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on the panel data of more than 400 U.S. manufacturing firms over the
period from 1970 to 1984.
The division between firms facing more and less severe financial con-
straints was made based on the size of firms' dividend payoffs. The
authors found that cash flow coefficients c  were significantly non-zero
for all categories of firms and were significantly higher for the low-
dividend-payout firms. Given this, the authors reject the assumption of
frictionless capital market and suggest the existence of financial con-
straints for all investigated firms.
Similar results were obtained in other researches (e.g. Blundell et al.,
1992; Gilhrist, 1991).
The main problems that were raised regarding the results of these tests
by other researches (e.g. Kaplan et al., 1997) and the author himself
(Hubbard, 1998) are following. First, to what extent Q is a good proxy for
firm's underlying investment opportunities in the case of information
asymmetry in capital market (even if put aside the problem whether the
marginal and average values of Q coincide). Second, to what extent the
investment-cash flow sensitivity provides a measure of financial con-
straints rather than non-value maximizing behavior of managers. Third, to
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what extent the a priory classification of firms is free from capturing the
risk-related attitudes of firms on capital market.
In order to avoid the problems with Q-values the new approaches based
on neoclassical investment model were developed. Using Euler equation
corresponding to the expected value maximization problem of the firm
and different specifications of adjustment costs function and financial
constraints, several tests were undertaken.
In this framework Bond and Meghir (1994) specify the model, which ex-
plicitly allows for debt-finance and financial assets, controls for imperfect
competition and does not rely on a measure of the shadow value of
capital. They investigate the following equation
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where time-specific dt and firm-specific ai effects are introduced in order
to control for variation in user cost of capital, Y stands for net output and
B is the borrowed capital. Under the assumption that the firm can raise
as much finance, as it desires at a given cost the theory predicts the
negative coefficient of the cash flow variable.
The authors test this equation on the sample of 626 quoted U.K. corpo-
rations over the period from 1971 to 1986. Their main finding is the sig-
nificantly positive coefficient at the cash-flow variable when the model is
estimated on the full sample of firms while the dynamic relationship be-
tween this period investment and its previous rate are broadly consistent
with what is expected to hold along the optimal path implied by adjust-
ment-cost model. Moreover, while estimating this equation on the sub-
sample of the firms where the relatively low dividend payout firms were
excluded, the authors find that the excess sensitivity of investment to
cash flow and other financial variables significantly reduced. The authors
interpret their finding as the evidence for existence of liquidity con-
straints for some firms from the sample.
As was mentioned above the existence of relationships between firms
and financial intermediaries specializing in reducing information costs
could also decrease the sensitivity of investment to the changes in net
worth. Therefore, in the investment-cash flow tests for a given level of in-
vestment opportunities we can expect that investment would be more
sensitive to cash flow for firms without intermediary relationship. It is this
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result that could be implemented while studying the possible reduction of
information asymmetry within Financial-Industrial Groups.
And in fact, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1994) confirmed this result
in the framework of Q-model for Japanese firms using the membership
in keiretsu as a basis for firms sorting. Shin and Park (1999) also find the
support for this hypothesis based on data for Korean chaebols.
Perotti and Gelfer (1998), following the way of investigation of investment
processes in Japanese firms also rely on the Q-model of investment.
They test it on two different sets of Russian enterprises: group and non-
group firms. The authors found that investments in non-group firms are
sensitive to changes in internal liquidity of the firms. This hypothesis was
rejected for firms participating in groups. Authors interpret this result as
an evidence of extensive financial reallocation across group firms and
existence of internal capital market, which facilitate the access to finance
for good projects by reallocating resources across firms.
Several problems arise with this result. First of all, the modeling of
investment within the framework of Tobin Q-model has some essential
shortages in its description of the Russian situation. And the most severe
shortage seems to be the failure of one of the most important
assumptions of this model, namely, the assumption of the effectiveness
of stock market. The stock market that existed in Russia over the last
few years probably could not be regarded as an effective one due to
either information problems of transforming economies or due to myopic
expectations of agents in the highly risky environment of the modern
Russian economy. Therefore, in these circumstances, we can not
assume that there is an efficient secondary market for firms' shares. And
thus we could use Q-values estimated on Russian stock market data
neither as a proxy for marginal present discounted values of profits from
new fixed investment nor as a proxy for constant investment opportu-
nities.
Similar problem could arise if we try to test the dynamic model of in-
vestment based on the Euler equation on Russian panel data. This model
assumes the arbitrage condition on the secondary stock market that also
implies the existence of this market and its efficiency.
Nevertheless, one important issue developed in papers mentioned above
could be very useful in our investigation of FIGs' advantages in Russian
economy. I mean the a priory separation of two sets of firms, group and
non-group firms, and testing the difference in the investment-changes in
firms' net worth sensitivities between group and non-group firms.
Since any specification of models mentioned above could not be tested
on Russian data, in this research we suppose to model the investment
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activity of Russian enterprises in the framework of another model that
seems to be more adequate to Russian reality and namely in the
framework of accelerator model. Under political and economic
uncertainty, it is more natural to assume positive dependence of
investment opportunities on changes in production rather than on the
expectations of future flow of payments induced by this investment.
Moreover, for Russian enterprises, with its lack of credits as one of the
reasons of continuing production decline in the country, there are the
changes in production that could be regarded as a proxy for the
measure of investment opportunities.
Facing the similar problem of obtaining appropriate data for study of
investment behavior in transition economy, Anderson and Kegels (1997),
Lizal and Svejnar (1997) also rely on the accelerator model of investment
demand in their investigations of investments in Czech industry.
3. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
For our test, one of the basic challenges is the choice of the appropriate
investment model. In this research we investigate the accelerator model
of investment adjusted for cash flow .
3.1. Demand side of fixed business investment
Under standard assumptions of the accelerator model of fixed invest-
ment the derived demand for gross investment is of the following form
(e.g., Clark, 1979):
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The intuition behind this equation is rather simple: as long as a firm's
output increases the firm finds reasonable to acquire new fixed assets in
order to meet the increasing production needs, and in the case of de-
clining sales a firm sells the useless assets. In both cases the term 1−dK
captures the depreciation expenses.
3.2. Supply of funds for investments in fixed assets
Assuming that the measure of the change in net worth available for many
firms is the cash flow variable (that is, retained earnings equal to the
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sum of earnings and depreciation allowances) it can be used as a proxy
for the change. Moreover, given that there is a lag between the moment
of making an investment decision and its implementation we could ex-
pect that not only current changes in net worth could matter but also the
lagged ones.
Therefore, we can get the empirical specification of the accelerator-cash
flow model
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where I stands for firm investment in fixed assets over the period, 1−K  is
fixed assets in the beginning of the period, Y∆  is changes of production
relative to previous period and CF is real cash flow of the firm over the
period that we use as a proxy for the volume of internal funds available
for investment. Fixed assets at the beginning of the period undo consid-
eration are used as a proxy for the size of the firm to scale all variables
in order to avoid heteroscedasticity problems.
At the next stage we are constructing a proxy for the information-related
costs borne by the firms. We can do it, for example, by a priori grouping
of the firms under consideration according to the relevant parameters
following which we will test the hypothesis that the investment-cash-flow
sensitivity is different for different groups of firms. As suggested by Hub-
bard (1998) one of the most direct measure of information costs could
be a relationship of the firms with financial intermediaries. Therefore, we
can use the fact of participation of the firms in Financial-Industrial
Groups as a proxy for the severity of the problem of information asym-
metry faced by the firms. If controlling for investment opportunity we get
the result that the firms participating in FIGs invest a lower fraction of
each incremental dollar of internal funds relative to firms that do not par-
ticipate in FIGs then we can conclude that the ties of firms with financial
intermediaries decrease information costs.
It was this result that was supported by empirical evidence in the case of
Japanese 'keiretsus' and Korean 'chaebols' (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1994;
Shin et al., 1999). Could we expect that the same result would be
obtained in the case of Russian Financial-Industrial Groups? First of all, it
is worth stressing that one of the main assumptions that has led to the
above conclusions is the availability of external finance for firms' fixed
investment. The expected difference in investment-cash flow sensitivities
of different sets of firms is interpreted as a consequence of the different
level of gaps between the cost of internal and external financing faced
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by these sets of firms. The case of the Russian economy of 1996 – 1997
was quite different in this sense. The presence of the high-yield GKO
market, underdeveloped financial market and the banking system as well
as  insufficient focus on the problems of corporate governance led to a
severe outflow of the sources of external finance from the real economy.
Neither the stock market nor the banking system provided the firms with
investment funds. Besides a very small volume of government credits
intended mainly for a small number of large enterprises, the only source
of funds available for fixed business investment was firms' retained
earnings. Therefore, we can not expect that negligible input of banks
loans could lead to decline in investment-cash flow sensitivity for the
subset of FIG's firms relative to the rest in economy. What pattern of
investment-cash flow sensitivity should we expect in this case?
3.2.1. FIG's effect. Let us consider two economies, the first one with
developed banking system that provides enterprises with credits for in-
vestment purposes, and the other where the only source of finance is
the firms' internal funds. In both economies there are independent firms
and firms participating in Financial-Industrial Groups. We want to com-
pare the difference in investment-cash flow sensitivities between two
samples of firms in  these economies.
Let us consider two firms with similar investment opportunities. We will
assume that one of the firms participates in a Financial-Industrial Group,
that is there is a bank that exercises a thorough control both over the
firm's bank accounts and the managerial actions, and the cost of this
monitoring is equal to zero due to special relations among the group
members. The second firm is independent one and we will assume that
the contract between the owner of the firm and its manager is not com-
plete, the owner of the firm cannot exercise costless control over the
firm's bank accounts and the managerial actions, due to which the man-
ager has discretion over the cash flow.
As long as we consider economy with external sources of finance, we will
assume that the interest rate on banks' credits is an increasing function
of the volume of credit due to the fact that  a larger volume of credit im-
plies a larger number of deals and payments, which provides an incen-
tive for manager or owner to act against the interests of the creditor.
Obviously, the slope of this function will be the larger, the larger is the
bank's monitoring expenses. In this case the participation of the firm in
FIG will lead to the decline in bank's monitoring expenses and therefore,
controlling the investment demand we will get the result that investment-
cash flow sensitivity will be lower for the sample of firms participating in
Financial-Industrial Groups.
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Now let us consider the second economy. As the only source of finance
to cover investment expenses is internally generated funds, therefore as
long as the cash flow will be lower than the investment demand, then the
firm will invest the total amount of available internal funds and invest-
ments will decline proportionally to a decline in the cash flow. Since the
manager of the independent firm has discretion over the cash flow and
can misappropriate some share of it while the manager of group firm is
subject to costless thorough control, then, given the same investment
demand the group firm will invest the larger proportion of its cash flow
compared to the independent firm. Thus, we can expect that comparing
two sets of firms, participating and not participating in FIGs, and control-
ling for investment opportunities the investment-cash flow sensitivity will
be larger for the set of FIGs' firms as long as the external financing of
investment is unavailable to firms.
To sum up, we can see that the conclusions with respect to the compari-
son of investment-cash flow sensitivities of independent firms and firms
participating in FIGs will essentially depend on the assumption concern-
ing the availability of external finance.
The reason for the importance of such assumption is as following. Given
the availability of external finance, better contract enforcement in firms
participating in groups relative to the independently operating firms in-
creases investment volumes and does not increase the slope of invest-
ment-cash flow dependence, since it is a different effect that prevails
here, namely a decline in the asymmetry of information between borrow-
ers and lenders within Financial-Industrial Groups relative to the rest of
the economy.
However, as long as the external financing is unavailable for firms' fixed
investment, the effect of a decrease in informational asymmetry in
Groups disappears and the main role is played by the effect of a better
ability of the bank to monitor the managerial actions. Better contract
enforcement in group firms results in an increase in volumes invested by
their firms and an increase in investment-cash flow sensitivity within this
set of firms relative to the rest of the economy.
3.2.2. Firm's size effect. A firm's size is another criteria for grouping.
Why could the size matter? Calomiris and Hubbard (1998) suggest that
the heterogeneity could arise in the case of debt-financed investments
due to a number of factors. First of all, small and medium-sized firms
have less access to impersonal centralized debt markets and bank loans
because these typical sources of finance require that firms have either
certain minimum levels of working capital or certain financial operating
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ratios. Second, over the periods when the total amount of finance for
credits in the economy is limited there would be small and medium-sized
borrower firms that would be denied credits in favor of larger firms. Both
of these factors are valid in the Russian case. According to experts' es-
timates the total amount of funds that could be attracted by all Russian
banks could not cover even half of investment demand in the economy.
In this circumstances it seems reasonable to use the size of a firm as a
criterion for information costs-related grouping.
Given this, we could expect that large Russian firms will be relatively less
financially constrained than small and medium-sized ones. Therefore we
can test the hypothesis that investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower in
the set of large firms versus that of small and medium-sized firms.
Now we can integrate both cases discussed above and consider an
economy where a small volume of external financing is available but the
primary source of investment funds is firms' retained earnings. Control-
ling for the size effect, we will test the specification (6) of the model for
sets of firms grouped according to the criterion of a firm's participation
in Russian unregistered Financial-Industrial Groups.
Given the data for two consecutive years we will test the following re-
gression equation
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where largemediumsmall ,, DDD  are dummies for the set of small, medium-
sized and large firms respectively, gr.unreg.D  stands for the dummy for
unregistered group subset of firms.
We will test the hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction terms
of the dummy for the large firm subset with scaled cash flows,
)1,0(large, −=jjγ , are negative. If we obtain empirical evidence in favor
of this hypothesis then, given our assumptions, it will indicate that large
firms actually have an access to external financing. We are interested in
the slope coefficients )large}medium,small,{;1,0( ∈−= ijjiµ , which
show the difference in the sensitivity of investment to internally gener-
ated funds between the independent and FIG firms. Based on above
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assumptions, we expect that these coefficients will be significant and
positive.
If we get empirical evidence in favor of our hypotheses we can suggest
that the firms in the Russian economy in 1996 – 1997 had very little ac-
cess to credits and any other forms of external finance, and that the
participation of firms in bank-led groups did lead to an increase in in-
vestment caused by an effective decrease in the costs of agency prob-
lem due to the better monitoring ability of banks that head such groups.
4. DATA DESCRIPTION
We use individual firms' accounting data for 1996 and 1997 from the
GNOZIS database which is compiled by the ECAM information and analy-
sis center. The original balance sheets and financial statements of more
than 25,000 Russian industrial enterprises compiled by GOSKOMSTAT
are presented in this database. However, the original gross investment
flows are available for a fraction of the firms. The volume of fixed busi-
ness investment is measured as a volume of fixed assets installed by the
firm over the year. The value of capital stock is measured as the stock of
fixed assets at the beginning of the period, cash flow is measured as the
revenues minus expenses minus change in inventories minus change in
accounts receivable plus change in accounts payable over the period
plus depreciation allowances. In order to get real changes in firms' per-
formance, 5-digit industries' producer price indexes were used.
In order to test the hypothesis that the participation of a firm in Russian
Financial-Industrial Groups reduces the costs of agency problem borne
by a firm we compile two lists of Russian firms. The firms that were listed
in the Financial-Industrial Groups Registry Book for 1997 were classified
as the registered group firms. We used several criteria to identify the
unregistered group firms. First, we relied on information about the firms'
ownership structure that was available from Skate Kapital Press. The
firms where the largest Russian banks (Menatep, Uneximbank, Inkom-
bank etc.), large oil companies (Yukos, Sidanko), large trade companies
(Roscontract) or foreign investors were major shareholders were classi-
fied as the unregistered group firms. The reviews of the largest bank-led
groups (e.g., Bunin et al., 1998) was used for these purposes. Firms re-
lated to groups such as Unified Energy Systems of Russia, Gazprom,
Svyazinvest and similar ones were also treated as the unregistered group
firms. Several industry-led groups (Energomashcorporaciya, Severstal'
etc.) were also included in the list of unregistered groups.
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Based on these approach, we compiled a list of 650 enterprises partici-
pating in unregistered groups and a list of 590 firms participating in reg-
istered groups. We treat the firms that do not appear in these two lists
as independent firms.
Due to the incompleteness of the database, the number of firms deemed
to be unregistered groups' firms is 105 in the regressions, the number of
firms regarded as registered groups' firms is 19 (this is why we exclude
firms participated in registered FIGs from regressions), and the number
of independent firms is 140. Thus, we should emphasize that we should
not overestimate the results that we obtained in this research because
the sample under investigation was incomplete.
Table 1. Sample by FIG's participation: summary statistics.
Indicators,
scaled by
Capital Stock
1997
Total
sample
Nobs=258
Independent
firms
Nobs=135
Firms from
registered
FIGs
 Nobs=19
Firms from
unofficial FIGs
Nobs=104
Investment,
1997
mean
std. div.
median
0.12
(0.15)
0.07
0.13
(0.18)
0.06
0.07
(0.09)
0.04
0.12
(0.11)
0.08
Changes in
sales,
1997–1996
mean
std. div.
median
–0.009
(0.36)
0.003
0.02
(0.37)
0.005
–0.05
(0.23)
–0.03
–0.04
(0.36)
0.003
Changes in
sales,
1996–1995
mean
std. div.
median
–0.04
(0.47)
–0.01
–0.001
(0.53)
0.002
–0.11
(0.55)
–0.06
–0.08
(0.32)
–0.02
Cash flow,
1997
mean
std. div.
median
0.18
(0.26)
0.11
0.19
(0.30)
0.11
0.30
(0.28)
0.21
0.16
(0.19)
0.10
Cash flow,
1996
mean
std. div.
median
0.16
(0.22)
0.11
0.18
(0.28)
0.12
0.24
(0.16)
0.23
0.13
(0.14)
0.10
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Since we had firm level data for 1996 and 1997, we were able to esti-
mate the accelerator type investment model for 1997 using two lags of
sales changes. After each ordinary least square procedure we performed
the Cook–Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity and if the null hypothesis
of constant variance was rejected at the 5% level of significance we used
the Huber/White/sandwich procedure of variance estimation.
The estimation of equation (7) gives the following result (column 1).
Table 2. Investment equation.
Variables scaled by K97 (1) Investment97 (2) Investment97
Change in Y97 –0.001  (0.026)
Cash Flow97 –0.102  (0.088)
Cash Flow97 × Dsmall × Dunreg fig 0.057  (0.099)
Cash Flow97 × Dmedium 0.214  (0.167)
Cash Flow97 × Dmedium × Dunreg fig –0.378  (0.260)
Cash Flow97 × Dlarge 0.152  (0.098)
Cash Flow97 × Dlarge × Dunreg fig –0.115  (0.102)
Change in Y96 0.095*  (0.040) 0.088*  (0.036)
Cash Flow96 0.184*  (0.092) 0.102*  (0.042)
Cash Flow96 × Dsmall × Dunreg fig –0.044  (0.136) –0.014  (0.073)
Cash Flow96 × Dmedium –0.169  (0.124) –0.022  (0.064)
Cash Flow96 × Dmedium × Dunreg fig 0.640*  (0.262) 0.375*  (0.188)
Cash Flow96 × Dlarge –0.430**  (0.141) –0.279**  (0.098)
Cash Flow96 × Dlarge × Dunreg fig 0.371**  (0.140) 0.248**  (0.092)
Constant 0.110**  (0.015) 0.108**  (0.014)
Observations 236 236
R-squared 0.15 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*    significant at 5% level;
**  significant at 1% level.
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We see that investment in fixed assets depends significantly on the
lagged changes in sales and lagged cash flows and does not depend on
current changes in sales and cash flows. This result could be easily ex-
plained by the timing of the investment process. If some time is needed
to implement an investment decision then we could expect that there are
previous year indicators of firm's performance that influence this year
level of installed fixed assets. According to Wald test we can not reject
the hypothesis of joint insignificance of current variables at 95% level of
confidence that allows us to estimate equation (7) using only lagged val-
ues of exogenous variables (column 2). Based on this result we can
suggest that the positive relation between investments and past changes
in sales implies the accelerator mechanism for investment demand in
Russian firms. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the
lagged cash flows is consistent with our expectations that the investment
of a Russian firm depends on its internal source of funds.
Wald test allows to reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of co-
efficients at lagged cash flows multiplied by size dummies and FIG's
dummy at 99% level of confidence. The same result holds for the hy-
pothesis of joint insignificance of coefficients at all interaction terms.
Therefore, we interpret the results in the following way.
We see that, controlling for investment opportunities, a change in lagged
internal funds leads to a similar change in investment of small and me-
dium-sized firms. Within the group of small firms the affiliation of a firm
with an unofficial FIG does not affect its investment-cash flow sensitivity.
This means that the participation of small firms in FIGs does not affect
the proportion of internal funds spent on investment. It also means that
our assumption that banks reduce the costs associated with the agency
problem is not valid for small firms participating in FIGs. However, we
should bear in mind that the small firms fall into the set of unofficial
group firms mainly due to their special position with respect to some
larger firm from such groups. Mostly, they are either subsidiaries or firms
playing a secondary role with respect to a larger enterprise from the
subset. Therefore, we could expect that the banks heading the groups
do not focus special attention on their management.
Overall, large firms are less liquidity constrained because the investment-
cash-flow slope is significantly lower for this group of firms. This result
supports the assumption that the small volume of external credits avail-
able to the real sector of the Russian economy in 1996–1997 was mainly
accessible for large firms, i.e., small and medium-sized firms were de-
nied credits in favor of larger firms.
The remarkable result is that the large and medium-sized firms from un-
official groups show a significantly different relationship between the in-
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vestments and cash flows than independent firms of the same size. The
coefficients of the corresponding interaction terms have the expected
positive signs, implying that for a certain level of investment opportuni-
ties and similar availability of external financing the large and medium-
sized firms from unofficial groups invest in fixed assets a larger propor-
tion of their internal funds than independent firms.
6. CONCLUSION
Based on the empirical results we can conclude that the accelerator-
adjusted for cash-flow model of fixed business investment works well
when is applied to the Russian firms' investment behavior in 1997 – 1996.
This result along with the results obtained for Check firms by Lizal and
Svejnar (1997) points out the workability of accelerator model framework
while analyzing the firm-level investment behavior in transition economies
where the inefficiency of stock markets does not allow to use their sig-
nals as parameters for investment decisions.
We can argue that the financial system that existed in 1996 – 1997 in
Russia did not provide external finance to the majority of enterprises.
Only the largest enterprises had access to credits the volume of which
was pretty low.
We find that the large and medium-sized firms from unregistered Rus-
sian Financial-Industrial Groups with the same investment opportunities
as the other firms of the same size invested a larger proportion of their
retained earnings. We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the hy-
pothesis that banks in such groups, being able to costlessly monitor the
financial flows of firms in the groups, exercise systematic control over
the managerial actions. This efficiently reduces the managerial discretion
over the retained earnings, which results in the implementation of the
larger number of investment projects compared to the independent firms
of the same size and the same prospective.
Our results indicate the different role of banks in Russian FIGs relative to
the banks in Japanese and Korean groups. Namely, banks in Russian
groups do not relax information asymmetry problem for groups' firms.
However, our results are sustainable with the hypothesis that banks in
Russian FIGs could help to solve the problem of contract enforcement in
firms participating in groups. In the economy with inefficient banking and
financial systems it means the increase in the volumes of investments
implemented by groups' firms relative to independent firms facing the
same investment opportunities. These facts emphasize the importance of
integrated structures in the economy where both insufficiency of invest-
ments and bad corporate governance are substantial impediments for
structural and political reforms.
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